ABSTRACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Calendar effects in stock market returns have confused financial economists for over 50 years. The evidence of equity market anomalies contradicts the prediction of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), at least in its weak form, because the predictable movements in asset prices provide investors with opportunities to generate abnormal returns. In addition, stock market anomalies may result from an inefficient flow of information in financial markets, which is a violation of an underlying assumption of the EMH.
The most important calendar effects studied in the literature are the day of-the-week effect (significantly different returns on some days of the week, usually higher Friday returns and lower Monday returns), the monthly or January effect (relatively higher January returns), the trading month effect (returns higher over the first fortnight of the month), the holiday effect (returns higher on the days before vacations), and more recently the Halloween effect (stock returns are significantly lower during the May-October periods versus the NovemberApril periods). Thaler (1987a Thaler ( , 1987b provides an early and partial survey, while Mills and Coutts (1995) provide more recent references.
Various factors, some of which are listed below, might explain calendar effects. For the monthly effect, several possibilities have been suggested: increased January cash flows due to holiday bonuses, pensions, etc.; selling of non profitable stocks for tax reasons at the end of the year and reinvestment in January; financial managers' attempts to show better end-of-year portfolio structure; beta coefficient increases in January. For day Vol. 13 No. 1
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No. 1 of-the-week effect, the following have been suggested: measurement errors; differences in settlement time of transactions; attitudes of certain investors groups; and investors' tendency to suspend the announcement of bad news until the weekend so that the market will have time to absorb the shock. While seasonal effects in advanced equity markets have been investigated extensively (see for example Gultekin and Gultekin, 1983; Brown et al., 1983; Kim, 1988; Mehdian and Perry, 1999) , emerging markets have received less attention especially equity markets in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region (see AL-loughani, 2003; Maghayereh, 2003; Aly et al., 2004; Alsaad et al., 2005) .
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the Halloween effect in 9 Arab equity markets in the Middle East region using daily data for local indices. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides review of the Halloween effect. Characteristics of the markets under examination are described in section III, section IV presents data and methodology, and section V presents the empirical results. Finally, section VI contains a summary and conclusion.
II. REVIEW OF THE HALLOWEEN EFFECT EVIDENCE
In their paper published in The American Economic Review, Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) consider that the Halloween puzzle is not economically exploitable after considering the impact of transaction costs. Data mining is another explanation but they eventually reject data mining as a possible explanation.
Higher returns over the November-April period could be due to higher risk in this period. The Halloween puzzle could be a materialization of other calendar time anomalies, in particular, the January effect. The puzzle could be caused by shifts in either interest rates or shifts in trading volume. And stock returns could be lower over the May-October period because of a seasonal factor in the provision of news. Bouman and Jacobsen (2002, p.1630) argue that none of these potential explanations offer much explanatory power for the existence of the Vol. 13
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Halloween puzzle and " we are faced with the following problem: history and practice tell us that the old saying is right, while stock market logic tells us it is wrong. It seems that we have not yet solved this new puzzle".
However, according to Fama's argument; Fama (1998) , empirical studies documenting long-term return anomalies like the Halloween effect are sensitive to methodology. Since most long-term return anomalies tend to disappear with reasonable changes to technique. Marberly and Pierce (2003) examine the robustness of the Halloween strategy to alternative model specifications for Japanese equity prices and find that the Halloween effect is concentrated in the period prior to the introduction of Nikkei 225 index futures in September 1986. While after the internationalization of Japanese financial markets in the mid of 1980s, the Halloween effect disappears. In addition, Marberly and Pierce (2004) examine the sturdiness of the Halloween effect to alternative model specifications for USA and extend the analysis to S&P 500 stock index futures. They conclude that "the documentation of the Halloween effect in the U.S disappears after an adjustment is made for the impact of outliers. In particular, the large monthly decline for October 1987 and August 1998 associated with the stock market crash and collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management, respectively. For the U.S., the empirical evidence indicates that the Halloween effect is not exploitable anomaly, and this is true for both spot and future prices".
As a logical extension of prior research, this paper examines the Halloween effect for 9 Arab equity markets in the Middle East region. (Dahel, 1999) . Within the group of Arab markets under examination here, the Saudi Arabian market is the largest of about 56 percent of the total capitalization value followed by Kuwait, Abu Dhabi markets respectively.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MARKETS
In terms of yearly turn over ratio, which is the ratio of the yearly trading value to market capitalization at the end of the year, the Saudi market is the most active followed by Kuwaiti equity market. 
IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The data set used in this paper consists of daily closing values for local indices for each market and has been gathered piece by piece from each market from January 1991 to December 2004. However, the time horizon differs from market to market according to the establishment date of that market or the availability of data. Studies by Haugen and Lakonishok (1988) among others suggest that stock returns are unusual large in January and label this observable fact the January effect.
The unusually large monthly returns documented by Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) during November-April periods could be a symptom of the January effect, Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) test for this possibility by including a January dummy in their regression analysis. To duplicate Bouman and Jacobsen's analysis, equation 1 is modified by inserting a second dummy variable J t, which is set equal to 1 whenever month t is January and 0 otherwise.
(2) Figure 1 presents the average returns in the period May-October and the period November-April for each country. As can be seen in figure 1 , the differences in returns in the two half-year periods are generally large and economically significant for 5 out of 9 markets. Average returns over the period May-October, with the exception of Kuwait, do not exceed 2 percent. However, during the period November-April they exceed the 2 percent in 5 countries, while 2 countries exhibit higher average returns during MayOctober period.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
As noted previously, a positive and significant α 1 parameter is evidence of a Halloween effect. Since α 1 denotes the average returns in the period NovemberApril in excess of the average returns during the other six months of the year. Thus the simple tests as to whether mean returns are higher during the period NovemberApril than during the period May-October.
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No. 1 Table 3 refers to the basic model (equation 1). In this case, 7 of the 9 countries under examination here exhibit highly statistically significant Sell in May effect at the 1 percent level. These results are consistent with those presented by Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) and support the hypothesis of significant
Halloween effect for some Arab stock markets.
Following Fama's argument (Fama, 1998) that most long-term returns anomalies tend to disappear with reasonable changes to technique. While the Sell in May Hypothesis Table 4 presents the results of the Halloween effect with adjustment for January effect. The results indicate that all access returns in January are entirely due to a January effect (α 2 ) and not caused by Sell in May effect, Note that the Halloween effect which presented by α 1 still the same, highly statistically significant without any noticeable reduction in α 1 's value except for Egypt, which α 1 parameter changes from 0.1977 to 0.0952 but still significant at 5 percent level. Indicating that despite the addition of January dummy, the Sell in May effect still exists for 7 of 9 countries under study in the Arab equity markets.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Halloween effect is considered an exploitable anomaly, which is taken as another example of market inefficiency. The rule is to sell stocks at the end of April and buy stocks at the end of October with all proceeds invested in a risk-free investment in the interim. Based on the old market saying "Sell in May and go away", Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) examine this phenomenon and find significant Sell in May effect in 36 out of 37 countries examined. Marberly and Pierce (2003) extend prior research on the Halloween effect to Japanese equity market and find that a significant Halloween effect is documented but only over the period to the internationalization of Japanese financial markets. The same authors in 2004 (Marberly and Pierce, 2004) find that the documented Halloween anomaly in the U.S., disappears after an adjustment is made for the impact of outliers. This paper extends prior researches on the Halloween effect to some Arab equity markets. A highly significant Halloween effect is documented for 7 out of 9 Arab equity markets used in this study in the Middle East region. Even after taking in account the January effect, the Halloween effect still exists in 7 of 9 Arab equity markets. The implication of such result put the issue of market efficiency under suspicion, at least in its weak form for the Arab stock markets under examination here. Since an efficient market anomalies should not exist.
